School of C o m p u t e r Science a n d Engineering, H e b r e w University, J e r u s a l e m 91904, Israel A b s t r a c t This paper deals with multi-unit combinatorial auctions where there are n types of goods for sale, and for each good there is some fixed number of units. We focus on the case where each bidder desires a relatively small number of units of each good. In particular, this includes the case where each good has exactly k units, and each bidder desires no more than a single unit of each good. We provide incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions for the general case where bidders are not limited to single minded valuations. The mechanisms we give have approximation ratios close to the best possible for both on-line and off-line scenarios. This is the first result where non-VCG mechanisms are derived for non-single minded bidders for a natural model of combinatorial auctions.
I n t r o d u c t i o n

C o m b i n a t o r i a l A u c t i o n s
In this paper we study multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In a combinatorial auction n non-identical items are auctioned simultaneously to m bidders; in a multi-unit combinatorial auction for each good i c { 1 , . . . , n } , there is a number ki of identical units. T h e combinatorial nature of the auctions comes from the fact that bidders value bundles of items. A brindle of items is a vector (dl...dn), where 0 < di _< ki is the number of items of good i in the bundle. Specifically, each bidder j has a valuation function vj that assigns a non-negative value for each bundle of items, vj : {0...kl} x ... x {0...k~} ~ R +. The goal of the auction is to maximize the total social welfare (surplUs): find an allocation that partitions the available items into bundles S1...Sm that maximizes ~j vj (Sj) . Most of the previous work on combinatorial auctions deals with the case of single-unit goods, i.e., when for all i, ki = 1. The combinatorial auction problem has recently received much attention due b o t h to its many applications and to its wide expressability powers that allow it to represent a wide range of situations that combine algorithmic issues with incentive issues -a combination that seems to be central to many "Internet-Computing" tasks. The reader is referred e.g. to [18, 21, 24] for a general overview, and to, e.g., [19, 28, 30, 26] and the many references therein for an introduction combinatorial auctions.
The key challenge in combinatorial auctions comes from a combination of the computational intractability of the general problem together with "incentive compatibility" requirements. Finding the optimal allocation in a combinatorial auction (with reasonable encoding of the valuations) !--e is computationally intractable (even to approximate within O(n2 ) [10, 28] ). However, many algorithmic techniques and heuristics may be applied to the problem yielding algorithms that either work for interesting special cases or that work reasonably well (from an experimental point of view) for hundreds and even thousands of items (e.g. [6, 7, 31, 30] ).
The notion of incentive compatibility takes into account the fact that the auctioneer does not really have access to the input, i.e. to the valuations of the bidders. Rather, the auctioneer only has access to the bids, which may be manipulated strategically by the bidders. An auction is called incentive compatible if bidders have no incentive to "lie" about their valuation, i.e. if rational bidders always bid their valuation -in which case the auctioneer at least has the proper input according to which he may allocate the items. (Formal definitions are postponed to section 2.) The key technique used for designing incentive compatible mechanisms is the, so called, VCG-mechanism [29, 5, 9] that first determines the optimal allocation and then charges carefully chosen payments for the allocated bundles of items.
Here comes the key clash between incentive compatibility and computational complexity: finding the optimal allocation is computationally intractable and hence the VCG-mechanism is intractable. Furthermore, the VCG technique really relies on the fact that the allocation is optimal and using a non-optimal allocation together with the VCG payment scheme does not yield incentive compatible mechanisms. The problem was first noticed in [15, 21] was shown to be essentially universal in [22] , and was further studied in [12] .
The only positive results known are for very restricted classes of bidders, "single-minded" bidders [15] , those that desire only a single subset of items. For the special ease of single-minded combinatorial auctions several polynomial-time incentive compatible mechanisms are known [15, 17, 1] , including one that achieves an O(~,/'~) approximation (the best possible). Nothing is known for the general case, and to date, no non-optimal incentive compatible combinatorial auction mechanism is known for general bidders (where optimality may be within any fixed family of allocations [22, 12] ).
This lack of knowledge is part of a general problem in mechanism design. The only non-VCG mechanisms known to date for any type of mechanism design problem are for those with an essentially single dimensional space of valuations -as is essentially the case with single-minded bidders. On the other hand, it is known that for problems where the valuation space is rich enough ("complete" over at least 3 outcomes) indeed only VCG mechanisms exist [8, 25] . A new negative results [13] generalizes the characterization of [25] by analyzing incentive compatible mechanisms over restricted domains of preferences. Still the question remained open for most restricted domains. Nothing is known for the intermediate cases where the valuation space is more than single dimensional but is not complete. Most mechanism design problems that arise from computational scenarios lie in this intermediate range.
In this paper we present the/irst such incentive compatible mechanism for a natural subset of muti-unit combinatorial auction problems. The mechanism runs in polynomial time even though finding the optimal solution is NP-hard. The approximation ratio of this mechanism is nearly as good as can be achieved in polynomial time. Following our result 1 , randomized incentive compatible mechanisms were given in [2] . Their approximation ratio depends on the ratio of highest to lowest valuation over all bidders and all commodities, which may be very high in practice. Moreover, their randomized mechanisms are good only in expectation and may produce very bad solutions with high probability. As opposed to the case in [2] , the main mechanism in this paper is deterministic and its approximation doesn't depend on the bidders' valuations.
Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions with Bounded Demand
The problem we deal with in this paper is a multi-unit combinatorial auction: there are n types of goods for sale, and for each / there are ki units of good i. We are interested in the case where each bidder desires a relatively small number of units of each good. Formally let the set of bundles U U = {0,... ,kl} x {0,... ,k2} x {0,... ,kn}. Each bidder has a valuation function vj : U --~ R +, and the aim is to maximize ~j vj(Sj) subject to the constraint that for each good i there exist at most ki bundles Sj that have requirement for good i. We assume that there exists a lower bound 0 and an upper bound O such that each bidder desires at most Oki units of good i and either no unit of good i or at least Oki units of good i. The simplest case is where each type of good has exactly k units and each bidder desires at most a single unit of each good, 0 = O = 1/k. We call this a combinatorial auction with k-duplicates.
This case was recently studied in [1] who developed an incentive compatible approximation mechanism for the single-minded bidder case. We derive an incentive compatible algorithm for the general non-single-minded case that achieves an approximation factor that is close to the best that can be achieved in polynomial time. Our first step is to characterize incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (both multi-unit, and regular), for the general case that bidders are not limited to be single minded. 1. fixes a price pj(S) for every possible allocation S to bidder j, and whenever bidder j is allocated S his payment is pj(S). (Note that pj(S) does not depend on vj.)
allocates to j the S that maximizes the value of vj(S) -pj(S) over all aUocations S (that can be allocated to j for any choice of vj.)
Our main result is an efficient incentive compatible mechanism for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with bounded demand: In the special case of k-duplicates,
It is worth noting that this bound becomes logarithmic for k = O(logn). This bound is close to being best possible in polynomial time as we prove, in theorem 4, that as a purely computational problem, a combinatorial auction with k duplicates is NP-hard to approximate to within a factor of O(nl/(k+l)-E). This generalizes the known inapproximability result for combinatorial auctions (k = 1).
En-route to this mechanism we pass through an online incentive compatible mechanism, that is of independent interest. In the online case we must have some a priori bounds on the maximal valuation. Our mechanisms employ the basic technique of the network algorithms of [3] and [4] of having item prices that increase exponentially as units of the item are handed out. As opposed to the case in [3] , our bidders are potentially interested in many possible allocations, and the choice between the possibilities is made in an incentive compatible manner. For the final (offiine) algorithm we add yet another ingredient that resembles the notion of a 2nd price auction. The single-minded mechanism of [1] for the k-duplicates problem is completely different and uses randomized rounding of the LP-relaxation of the problem.
Definitions
Instead of discussing an auction where each good i has ki indivisible units, It will be simpler to normalize by ki, and assume that each good has 1 unit, but is divisible. (Our formalism will allow expressing the underlying indivisibility of each original unit.) Thus our problem is as follows: There are n goods, each has 1 divisible unit.
Valuations
A bundle of items is a vector of quantities in U = [0, 1] n. A valuation is a function v specifying how much each bundle of items is worth to a bidder. I.e. for each vector of quantities A = (A(1)...A (n)) c U, v(A) is how much money is this player willing to pay to get A(0 fraction of a unit of good i, for all i.
Definition 1 (valuation) A valuation is a function v : [0, 1] n ~ R + with the following properties:
• v is monotone in each coordinate (free disposal).
•
v((~) = 0 (nor~raalization)
In our fi)rmalism v need not be continuous. For instance in the combinatorial auction problem with k-duplicates the natural way to represent the indivisibility of good number 1 other than into fra(:tions of size exactly 1/k is to have for all valuations v(a, ...) = v(O; ...) for all a < 1/k.
We say that a valuation is (0, O)-bounded if it is not interested in getting less than 0 units of any it(,m nor in getting more than 0 units of any item. Formally:
Definition 2 ((0, O)-bounded valuation)A valuation v is (8, O)-bounded if for all i and A (i) < O, we have that v(A(i)...A (n)) = v(A(1)...A (i-1), 0, A(i+i)...A(")), and for all i and A (i) > 0, we have that
v(A(~)...A (n)) = v(A(1)...A (i-1) , O, A(i+I)...A (~)).
Representation of Valuations
In this paper our mechanisms use an abstract black-box representation of valuations. The natural black-box representation would be to output the value v(A(1)...A (n)) on a query (A(1)...A(n)). This is called a valuation oracle for v. It turns out that this is not enough; additionally we need the "demand oracle" representation of the valuation [16] .
Definition 3 (demand oracle) A demand oracle for valuation v accepts as input a vector of item prices (p0)...p(n)) and outputs the demand for the items at these prices, i.e. it outputs the vector A = (A(1)...A(n)) that maximizes the surplus v(A)-< A,p >= v(A0)...A (n)) -~i A(i)P (i).
Notice that a demand oracle for a ((0, (3)-bounded valuation always returns for every good i,
In a concrete algorithmic implementation, the valuations will be given in some "bidding language", and our algorithms will work efficiently (in polynomial time) as long as the bidding language allows efficient computation of answers to valuation oracle and to demand oracle queries. In appendix A we shortly discuss the range of such languages. In particular note that these two types of oracle queries can be answered easily for the case that each bidder puts forward an arbitrary list of mutually exclusive bids for packages. 
Definition 5 (value of an allocation) The value of an allocation A is V(A) = Ej vj(Aj
allocates to j, A that maximizes the value of vj(A)-pj(A) over all A that can be allocated to j (for any choice (~f vj.)
Proof: We first show that these two conditions are sufficient. We now show that tliey are necessary. Assume to the contrary that the first condition does not hold, i.e. that for some v_j, and two valuations vj and v~, the mechanism yields the same allocation A to player j, but charges different payments p > p~, respectively, from him. Now it is clear that for the case where bidders' valuations are v_j and vj, for bidder j to declare v~ instead of vj will improve his utility (since the allocation remains the same, while the payment decreases), contrary to the definition of incentive compatibility. Now assume that the first condition holds, but assume to the contrary that the second condition does not hold, i.e. that for some v_j, and valuation vj, the mechanism allocates A to j with the property that vj(A) -pi(A) < vj(A') -pj(A'), for some A' that can be allocated to j, e.g. if he bids v~. But this exactly says that for the case where bidders' valuations are v_j and vj, then for bidder j to declare v~ instead of vj will improve his utility (since he is now allocated A ~ and charged pj(At)), contrary to the definition of incentive compatibility. |
The simplest way to use this theorem for constructing incentive compatible mechanisms is to choose for each bidder j item prices p = (p(1)...p(n)), set pj()~) =< p, A >, and then use a demand oracle for vj to choose )~ that maximizes the utility uj()~) = vj(A)-< p, )~ >. In the second part of the paper we introduce a slight modification to this simple form, where we set the price of the complete bundle, pj ((0, O,,, ,, 0)), separately, still staying within the general characterization.
The Generic Algorithm
Both our online and offiine algorithms are based on a generic algorithm described here.
Description of the Algorithm
The logic of the generic algorithm is simple: At any point in time good i has price p(0. The bidders arrive one after the other, and when bidder j is considered he chooses which bundle he prefers according to the current prices. The prices p(0 are initialized to some parameter P0 and are increased whenever a quantity of that good is allocated. The increase in price is exponential with a rate r per unit allocation. 
Generic Algorithm with
Analysis of Generic Algorithm
The correctness of algorithm involves three elements: incentive compatibility, validity (i.e. that no item is over-allocated), and approximation ratio. We start with incentive compatibility:
Lemma 1 For any exogenous choice of parameters Po and r, the generic algorithm is incentive compatible.
The proof that this algorithm is incentive compatible derives directly from theorem 1. Note that the values of the parameters can not depend on the valuations since otherwise incentive compatibility may be lost. Our next step is to prove the validity of the algorithm, i.e. that it never allocates more than the available quantity of each good. This is true as long the values of P0 and r satisfy a certain condition. Let l~ 0 = j~l x~ 0 denote the total allocation of good i to all players preceding j and let 
Lemma 3 V (ALG) (1-t-r_~_~) > V ( O P T ) -nPo.
We use Lemma 4 and[ Lemma 5 to obtain Lemma 3. Let V (A) denote the total sum of valuations for the allocation of algorithm A to the bidders• Our goal is to prove that V (OPT) < C . V (ALG) where C is the approximation ratio.
emm , prices at the end of allocation, P, p(1) p(n) and where p,(O = p(O) . r#j )
Proof:
This inequality derives from the demand oracle definition.
The last inequality holds true since Y , > Y j for any j. Since (i~j, ~j ) > 0 we get the lemma. ! Summing all bidders will give us the next Corollary. Corollary 
V (ALG) > V (OPT) -~ p.(O. i
Since the algorithm is individually rational (i.e each bidder pays no more than the value of the bundle he gets) the total revenue is a lower bound for the total valuation. When bidder j is allocated we have 
V(ALG)(r°~I) i
Together with corollary 1 we obtain Lemma 3.
Combining these three lemmas we immediately obtain a incentive compatible, valid, approximation algorithm as long as the following two conditions on the parameters P0 and r hold:.
nPo < V(OPT)
--2
r 1-° > --OPo"
Under these conditions no item is over allocated and the approximation ratio achieved is C --
An Online Algorithm
Notice that the generic algorithm is online in the sense of [14] : players arrive one at a time, and the allocation and the payment of each player is determined as he arrives. The only thing missing in order to obtain a complete online algorithm is the choice of parameters. In our algorithm, this choice needs to be made before any players arrive. This can only be done if we have some a priori bounds on the possible valuations of players. The following assumption suffices:
A priori known bound on maximal valuation: There exists a priori known bounds vmi~ and 
The Final Algorithm
In this section we give an incentive compatible approximation algorithm that does not require a priori known bounds on the valuations of players. It is easy to see that such an algorithm can not be online, and indeed we will choose the parameters P0 and r as a function of the valuations.
If we do not need to worry about incentive compatibility then a choice of Po = vmax/(2n) and r = (2n/O) 1/0-°) will satisfy the two conditions of section 4.2. Moreover, this is "almost" incentive compatible: since these parameters only depend on v~x, incentive compatibility is maintained for all players except .for the one with the maximum valuation v,~. (In the case where there is more than one bidder with the maximum valuation Vmax the incentive compatibility is maintained.) Our challenge is to design an algorithm that. is also incentivecompatible for the player with highest valuation. The basic idea is to use a "2nd" price type mechanism for this player. Specifically, when calculating the allocation and payments for this player use a different set of parameters, those calculated using the second highest price vs~c rather than the first highest price. In order to make this idea work we need to make a few delicate changes in the algorithm so as to fix the problems caused by treating the highest price player differently than the others. While it may seem from this description of the algorithm that we are running m different copies of the generic algorithm, in reality we are only running two copies. Notice that for all players except b, the value v~x is the same and equals to Vmax. Note also that none of these players will change their allocation by choosing the whole bundle at price vine in the last line of the algorithm, since their valuation is no more than vmax. Thus the same generic algorithm is run on all of them. -~v 1 )Vmax we are done. Otherwise, So if Vsec < 4 max < (1 In order to show the proof of Theorem 4 we will show a reduction from Maximum independent Set (MIS) problem in Hypergarphs.
Definition 8 A K-Uniform Hypergarph HK = (V,E) is a hypergarph with all edges of size K.
Definition 9 Maximum Independent Set problem for Hypergraphs: Given a hypergarph HK, find a maximum independent set, i.e. find a set of vertices with maximum size such that no subset of these vertices form an edge in HK.
The result is based on the following theorem. Theorem 5 was also stated in [11] . Proof: (of theorem 4): Given an instance of an (K + 1)-uniform hypergraph HK ~--(V,E), we define an instance of the K-duplicate multi unit combinatorial auction as follows: For every vertex we have a bidder, and for every edge we have a good which is requested by each of the bidders to the vertices of that edge. The number of goods is n = IEI _< ( K+I IVI ) --< IVIK+I"
In a solution for the multi unit combinatorial auction any good is allocated to at most K different bidders and therefore the set of vertices corresponding to the accepted bidders is an independent set in the hypergraph HK and vice versa. This implies it is hard to approximate the multi unit combinatorial auction within O(n~Z~) unless NP = ZPP. |
For completeness we present here a simple proof of Theorem 5. Proof: We reduce the MIS problem for graphs to the MIS for K-uniform hypergraphs. Given a graph G = (V, E) we define the following hypergarph HK: HK has the same set of vertices as G, and every subset of vertices with size K that contain an edge in G form an edge in HK. Claim 
I is a MIS in G with size > K if and only if I is a MIS in HK with size > K.
Proof: Let I be a MIS in G. Then I is an IS in HK because no edge in G is contained in I, so no subset of I form an edge in HK. I is also MIS: assume to the contrary that there is a MIS in HK f such that I' > III . Since no subset of I' form an edge in HK, by the definition of H g no two vertices in f form an edge in G. Therefore I' is a MIS in G -contradiction the fact that I is a MIS in G and I' >III. For the same arguments if I is a MIS in HK, then I is also a MIS in G. | Since MIS problem for graphs is hard to approximate within O (tvl 1-~) unless NP=ZPP, MIS problem for hypergraphs is also hard to approximate within O (Ivl 1-~) unless NP=ZPP. |
